Christchurch CBD Tourism Governance

The study's central argument is that the governance of Christchurch's urban tourist spaces shifted towards corporatist models after the 2010-2011 earthquakes. This shift is evident in the handling of the Arts Centre, Town Hall, and Performing Arts Precinct redevelopments. The process was marked by significant lobbying from powerful stakeholders, effectively excluding less influential actors from decision-making. This resulted in projects and proposals being developed by a select group behind closed doors, with affected communities only receiving tokenistic input. Post-earthquake policies embraced the rhetoric of early urban regeneration and reinforced neoliberal urban development principles. The strong focus on tourism in policy discussions surrounding these key sites suggests that Christchurch's post-earthquake redevelopment mirrors similar recovery agendas in cities worldwide. The research contrasts this post-disaster governance with pre-existing models, emphasizing the change in power dynamics and decision-making processes. The study directly addresses the lack of research focusing on the detailed performance of social and political institutions during urban emergencies. The research aims to fill this gap by examining the Christchurch case in detail, using a detailed case study methodology to understand the intricate factors that affected the post-earthquake redevelopment.

This dissertation focuses specifically on urban recovery and the governance of urban tourist spaces in Christchurch after the September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes. It examines the rebuilding of tourist attractions and analyzes the political, social, economic, and environmental factors that shaped decision-making, planning, and implementation. Unlike much existing literature, which primarily uses a business approach to post-disaster tourism crisis management, this thesis draws on social theory and planning studies. It integrates insights from research on tourism crises and disaster management, urban tourism, tourism policy and planning, and tourism destination governance. The aim is to advance knowledge beyond disciplinary boundaries, combining different approaches rather than replacing them. The study focuses on destination recovery at the scale of individual tourist attractions following natural disasters, comparing the socio-political contexts before and after the earthquakes. It addresses the limited existing research on the detailed performance of social and political institutions during urban emergencies, emphasizing the need for a more holistic understanding of the post-disaster recovery process. Existing works often focus on single organizations or destinations rather than the broader political context.

The policy analysis focuses on the period between September 2007 and September 2014, a timeframe chosen for four key reasons. First, it encompasses the years following major reforms of the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA 2002), the Building Act 2004 (BA 2004), the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEMA 2002), and ongoing amendments to the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA 1991). Second, this period includes the Christchurch City Council (CCC) and Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC) strategies implemented after local authority reforms. Third, it acknowledges the relevance of urban regeneration strategies and tourism-related development within the larger political, social, and cultural context of Christchurch, acknowledging the effectiveness of such strategies in fostering local distinctiveness. Finally, it aims to understand how these strategies adapted following the sudden and unavoidable natural disaster of the earthquakes. The study addresses the question of whether urban redevelopment, public finance, the organization of public institutions, and socio-economic problems fundamentally change in a post-disaster environment. The research considers the unpredictable nature of disasters, viewing the post-disaster crisis phase as crucial for shaping recovery efforts.

The 2010 and 2011 Christchurch earthquakes had a severe economic impact on both the regional and national GDP. Nearly 3,000 businesses in the Christchurch CBD closed between September 2010 and June 2011, leading to substantial job losses across sectors, including manufacturing and retail. Tourism businesses also suffered significant negative economic impacts due to the earthquakes, affecting not only the CBD but also the wider Christchurch area and other tourist destinations in the Canterbury region and South Island. The economic downturn is detailed through statistics about job losses and business closures, citing specific sources such as NZSTATS. The impact on tourism includes loss of tourist arrivals and nights and damage to heritage attractions. The study highlights significant issues with insurance coverage and liability following the earthquakes, noting instances where insurance companies faced difficulties in meeting claims. The uncertainty surrounding insurance payouts significantly impacted the city council's financial standing and the decisions made in rebuilding efforts. This created significant challenges for developers, homeowners, and retailers in the CBD. The study mentions several key insurance companies involved (AMI Insurance, Western Pacific Insurance, Ansvar), and highlights the cascading effect of such issues on the recovery effort.

The establishment of the Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) under CERA marked a key governance shift in the Christchurch CBD rebuild. The national government's decision to override the local authority's initial recovery plan and create the CCDU is detailed. This resulted in a rapid development of a new blueprint plan within a 100-day period, including the identification of anchor projects and compulsory land purchases. The CCDU became responsible for attracting private investment, marginalizing the involvement of pre-existing tourism stakeholders and authorities. While the Christchurch & Canterbury Tourism (C&CT) focused on promotion and re-branding efforts, they had little influence on investment attraction. The study highlights a shift from public sector-led initiatives in pre-earthquake tourism development to a situation where CERA and the CCDU became gatekeepers of private investment. This shift resulted in several challenges and ultimately a limited role for local tourism stakeholders in shaping the rebuild. Even pre-existing successful tourism ventures were largely left out of the redevelopment decision-making process. The research contrasts the post-earthquake governance with the pre-earthquake model, focusing on changes in stakeholder roles and power dynamics. The limited role of stakeholders in driving tourism development is highlighted.

This section establishes Christchurch's pre-earthquake vulnerabilities, focusing on its geographical and geological characteristics. The city's founding in 1850 involved selecting a swampy area prone to flooding, presenting ongoing drainage challenges for local and regional authorities due to inadequate techniques and high import costs. Geological surveys conducted in the 1960s and 1990s identified significant portions of the CBD, particularly near the Avon River and its east side, as highly susceptible to liquefaction. Furthermore, the region's history of earthquakes, dating back to the 1880s, and the presence of an active fault crossing the South Island highlight the city's inherent seismic risk. The text emphasizes the significant role of these geological conditions in shaping the city’s development and the consequences these factors had on the city's response to future earthquakes. Orchiston (2012) is cited, emphasizing the importance of incorporating disaster emergency planning into sustainable tourism strategies, which highlights a critical oversight in the city's pre-earthquake planning. This establishes the context for understanding the severity of the damage during the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes.

The section analyzes the existing governance structures and institutional arrangements in Christchurch before the earthquakes. It notes the significant reforms implemented through legislation such as the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA 2002), the Building Act 2004 (BA 2004), the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEMA 2002), and amendments to the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA 1991). These reforms, while aimed at improving governance, are evaluated within the context of the city's existing vulnerabilities. The strategies outlined by the Christchurch City Council (CCC) and the Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC) after these reforms are highlighted, specifically those concerning Christchurch's status as a tourist destination. The research argues that the existing legislation and governance structures were inadequate in addressing the underlying issues and vulnerabilities of Christchurch in the face of future earthquakes. This assessment of the effectiveness of pre-existing legislation is critical, as it explains the extent of the damage and the ensuing difficulties in the recovery period. This section sets the stage for evaluating the post-earthquake response and governance changes.

The section provides a detailed description of the Christchurch CBD before the earthquakes, highlighting its characteristics as a tourist business district, as defined by Getz (1993). This detailed description includes the geographical boundaries of the CBD, its approximate population, and the types of businesses present (administrative offices, retail, and hospitality). It emphasizes that this existing development pattern, combined with the geographical limitations of the area (swampy land and drainage issues), created an environment vulnerable to significant disruption and damage should a major earthquake strike. The historical context of the city’s development is explained, focusing on the selection of the initial settlement area and its inherent vulnerabilities. The description provides the necessary background information for understanding the devastating impact of the earthquakes on the CBD and for evaluating the subsequent redevelopment efforts. By describing the pre-existing development, the extent to which this was affected by the earthquakes can be shown. This establishes the baseline for comparison with the post-earthquake developments and changes.

This section delves into Christchurch's pre-earthquake geological context, focusing on seismic risks and fault lines. The text describes the September 4th, 2010, earthquake, which revealed the previously unmapped Greendale Fault and its impact on geological understanding of the area. Similarly, the February 22nd, 2011, earthquake contributed to the identification of two other faults, the Port Hills Fault and the Christchurch Fault. The research highlights the significance of these discoveries in understanding the city’s vulnerability to earthquakes. It discusses the implications for urban planning and tourism development, emphasizing the need for disaster emergency planning as proposed by Orchiston (2012). This provides a scientific and geological understanding of the causes of the earthquakes. It further highlights that, despite some prior geological knowledge about the earthquake-prone nature of the area, there was still insufficient understanding of the precise location and activity of the fault lines, emphasizing the limitations of pre-earthquake geological surveying and awareness. The impacts and concerns relating to the larger Alpine Fault are also mentioned.

Following the February 2011 earthquake, the creation of the Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) within the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) represented a pivotal shift in governance for the Christchurch CBD rebuild. The government's decision to bypass the Christchurch City Council (CCC)'s initial draft plan and establish the CCDU is highlighted. The CCDU, along with a Blueprint Team and seconded CCC staff, was given 100 days to produce a revised CBD plan including at least 12 anchor projects. The secrecy surrounding this process is emphasized, with all involved prohibited from releasing information to the public. Upon the plan's release (CCRP), CERA utilized its special powers to acquire land for these projects, with the CCDU conducting closed-door negotiations with the CCC's Chief Executive. The CCDU subsequently took the lead in attracting private investment for the rebuild and anchor projects. This shift in governance from the original plan, which envisioned the CCC as the primary driver of redevelopment, created significant changes in decision-making processes and stakeholder involvement.

The CCRP's emphasis on anchor projects required compulsory land purchases and established specific area development criteria for private investors. This process, while aiming to accelerate the CBD's rebuild, encountered several challenges. The CCC faced financial difficulties and struggled to secure sufficient insurance payouts, while uncertainty about public-sector anchor projects led many private investors to invest outside the central city. Local developers voiced concerns over the CCDU's management, publicly calling for a replacement of the CCDU director. The text mentions the slow release of land titles back to original owners by the CCDU and the overall struggle to attract private sector investment due to uncertainty and logistical challenges. The difficulties in securing insurance payouts and the financial struggles of the CCC further complicated the process, highlighting the complexities of managing the post-disaster redevelopment. This section details the complications arising from the implementation of the CCRP, with an emphasis on the interplay between public and private sector actions and the various obstacles faced by those responsible for the rebuild.

The section details significant issues with insurance coverage and liability in the aftermath of the earthquakes. The government's bailout of Christchurch-based AMI Insurance is contrasted with the failure of Queenstown-based Western Pacific Insurance to meet its liabilities, impacting property owners. London-based Ansvar's establishment of a dedicated unit to handle insurance claims for commercial properties and heritage buildings illustrates the scale of the challenge. The uncertainty surrounding insurance significantly affected the CCC's insurance company, Civic Assurance, leaving taxpayers to cover substantial uninsured losses. Ongoing negotiations between the CCC, Civic Assurance, and reinsurers are highlighted, revealing tensions between councilors and the Chief Executive, Tony Marryatt. The section emphasizes the significant financial and logistical problems caused by the failure or delays in the provision of insurance claims. These financial difficulties are then connected with a lack of private sector confidence in the central city rebuild and the overall challenges posed in the implementation of the post-earthquake plan.

This section analyzes the role of public-private partnerships in the Christchurch CBD's post-earthquake recovery. The lack of collaboration between the public and private sectors is highlighted, despite calls from stakeholders for stronger ties. The development and implementation of the CCRP fell short of achieving the collaborative climate advocated for since CERA's establishment. The limited role played by tourism stakeholders is a central theme. While the C&CT focused on promotional and re-branding efforts, they were largely excluded from the investment attraction process, a function that was transferred from the CDC to CERA and the CCDU. A proposed tourism precinct, suggested by a ward councillor, was not included in the CBD blueprint, further illustrating the marginalization of tourism-specific concerns in the overall recovery plan. The role of CERA and the CCDU in attracting private investment is described and critically analyzed, comparing the pre and post earthquake governance of tourism in Christchurch.

This section draws parallels between Christchurch's post-earthquake recovery and the dynamics of disaster capitalism. The quick development and implementation of market-driven redevelopment strategies are discussed in relation to the diversion of recovery funds for anchor projects. This resonates with observations from New York post 9/11 and New Orleans post-Hurricane Katrina, where similar patterns of favoring corporate interests over community needs were observed. The research emphasizes that disaster recovery agendas often prioritize corporate interests, increasing the vulnerability of those directly affected by the disaster, and this is particularly true in relation to the Christchurch situation. This illustrates the broader context of Christchurch's post-earthquake redevelopment and is connected to the earlier discussion regarding the inadequate support given to businesses and individuals affected by the earthquake.

Before the earthquakes, the Arts Centre's governance was structured around the Arts Centre Trust (ACTB), established under a Trust Deed. The ACTB comprised 13 members representing various stakeholders, including prominent individuals appointed by the Arts Centre Trust Bill (ACTB) and representatives from the Christchurch City Council (CCC), Canterbury Tourism (CCT), Ngāi Tahu, the New Zealand Historic Places Trust (NZHPT), and the University of Canterbury. This representative governance model, while aiming for inclusivity, presented challenges. The ACTB's director and management team sometimes exceeded their mandate, as seen in a 2009 instance where tenancy agreements were amended without adequate tenant input, drawing criticism from long-term tenant Richard Sinke. This highlights existing power imbalances within the ACTB's pre-earthquake governance, foreshadowing similar issues that arise in the post-earthquake redevelopment.

The February 2011 earthquake dramatically altered the Arts Centre's situation. Following inspections, 22 of its 23 buildings were red-stickered, restricting tenant access. Despite the subsequent lifting of emergency cordons, comprehensive damage assessments proved difficult. The high uncertainty surrounding the Arts Centre's recovery led to the unilateral termination of most leases (except for Canterbury Cheesemongers, who had recently secured a long-term lease). This event precipitated major changes in the Arts Centre's governance and redevelopment, leading to discussions about its future and the necessity to consider alternative arrangements to ensure the rebuilding of the facilities. This section highlights the immediate impact of the earthquakes on the site's physical structure and the subsequent decisions made regarding the future of the tenants and the Arts Centre.

Following the earthquake, the governance of the Arts Centre underwent further changes. An amendment to the Trust Deed addressed the Centre's future in case of ACTB dissolution. Attempts by key figures (Ken Franklin and John Simpson) to shape the decision-making process regarding this amendment are discussed, revealing power dynamics and competing interests. A governance review, led by Graeme Nahkies, involved key stakeholders. The subsequent Arts Centre Vision, while claiming to seek community feedback, is critiqued for its limited and non-inclusive engagement. This limited engagement despite claims of seeking wider community input is highlighted as an example of non-decision making, similar to patterns observed elsewhere in Christchurch. The small number of submissions received highlights the challenges in achieving meaningful community participation in the redevelopment plans. This illustrates a continuation of prior power dynamics and a lack of true inclusivity in shaping the future of the Arts Centre.

The section focuses on how post-earthquake legislation impacted the Arts Centre's recovery. The use of Orders in Council to modify existing legislation to facilitate earthquake recovery is noted. Specifically, changes related to the Historic Places Act 1993 (HPA 1993), the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA 1991), and the Building Act 2004 (BA 2004) are detailed. The significant pro-development reforms affecting heritage legislation, leading to the repeal of the HPA 1993 and its replacement with the Heritage New Zealand Act 2014 (HNZA 2014), is highlighted. The text emphasizes the shift in power dynamics, with the Arts Centre having greater autonomy over redevelopment decisions. The new legislation allowed for the implementation of more interventionist recovery measures than previously possible. This analysis emphasizes the significant implications of legislative changes on the Arts Centre’s redevelopment and the ability to prioritize development over heritage conservation.

The post-earthquake governance of the Arts Centre prioritized development over heritage conservation, despite the stated commitment to preserving heritage buildings. While the New Zealand ICOMOS Charter was acknowledged, the emphasis on “where possible” reveals a prioritization of financial sustainability over strict heritage protection. The Arts Centre’s financial viability is presented as a major concern, leading to decisions that might compromise aspects of heritage conservation. The passing of the Arts Centre of Christchurch Trust Bill (ACCTB) is discussed, highlighting the importance of ensuring the future financial sustainability of the Arts Centre, particularly by establishing a more skilled Trust Board. This legal protection provided by the ACCTB is analyzed as a measure to avoid any future alterations to the Trust Deed. However, this focus on financial sustainability ultimately reveals a situation where heritage conservation is subordinated to market-based economics.