NZ & Commonwealth: 1945-1950

New Zealand emerged from World War II with immense pride in its contribution to the British Commonwealth. The war strengthened Commonwealth unity and reinforced New Zealand's bond with the Crown and Britain. Even before the war's end, the Labour government's commitment to collective security, though sometimes conflicting with the United Kingdom, was evident in its participation in the League of Nations. Despite the League's failures, New Zealand remained committed to its ideals, hoping for a post-war realization of these principles. This commitment is highlighted by New Zealand's participation in the Moscow Declaration (October 1943), which announced the intention to create a new international organization, and their subsequent assertion in the Canberra Pact of their desire for an equitable role in this new organization's planning and establishment.

The creation of the United Nations became a central focus for New Zealand's post-war foreign policy. While acknowledging the importance of cooperation with the great powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain), the New Zealand delegation, led by Prime Minister Peter Fraser, voiced strong criticisms of the draft proposals formulated at Dumbarton Oaks. Fraser emphasized the excessive authority given to the great powers at the expense of other members. He argued that the veto power of the Security Council lacked the necessary will and determination to fulfill their responsibilities. New Zealand advocated for a stronger commitment to collective security for all members, proposing amendments to restrict the use of the veto and ensure General Assembly endorsement of Security Council decisions. Although these amendments were ultimately defeated, they demonstrate New Zealand's active participation and commitment to shaping the new international organization, even if its idealistic vision for collective security wasn't fully embraced by other nations.

The text details New Zealand's post-war security concerns within the context of the Pacific. Following World War II, the United States maintained extensive facilities on various South and Southwest Pacific islands under British, Australian, and New Zealand control. The desire to maintain this strategic presence in peacetime led to discussions regarding base rights. New Zealand's Chiefs of Staff advocated for an expanded Committee of Imperial Defence to oversee Commonwealth strategic planning. This envisioned a regional organization for the Pacific, coordinating with London headquarters, extending to technical and scientific research. While a trilateral defense agreement between the UK, Australia, and New Zealand was envisioned, it was deemed essential to associate with the preeminent power of the United States, mirroring the Canadian-US defense agreement. However, despite proposals for a regional security commitment, the United States ultimately proved unwilling to formalize a Pacific defense agreement with Commonwealth members, although American power implicitly guaranteed New Zealand's security due to the US Navy's dominance of the Pacific. The lack of a formal pact and the absence of an immediate threat in the post-war Pacific shaped New Zealand's approach to regional security.

The passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1947 marked a significant step in clarifying and expanding New Zealand's independence. While previous conservative governments had opposed its adoption, fearing it would lead to the Empire's disintegration, the Labour government's eventual enactment, albeit after a 12-year delay, signaled a shift towards complete parliamentary sovereignty. The delay, however, highlights the complexities of the situation. The Statute was a pre-war issue that was delayed due to various factors, including concerns about maintaining Commonwealth uniformity concerning royal succession, titles, and the oath of allegiance. The Labour government's decision to eventually support the Statute, despite internal debate, reflects a pragmatic approach prioritizing Commonwealth goodwill over immediate action. While the adoption fulfilled the expectation of achieving full parliamentary sovereignty, the government's approach reveals a nuanced understanding of independence, balancing autonomy with the preservation of the Commonwealth relationship.

The introduction of New Zealand citizenship, alongside the continuing status of British subject, further illustrates the evolving understanding of New Zealand's identity within the Commonwealth. This dual status was part of a Commonwealth-wide formula aimed at maintaining the common status of British subject while allowing individual Dominions to define their citizenships. The legislation itself wasn't presented as a declaration of national identity, but rather as a technical and practical adjustment to reflect existing practice. This emphasis on practicality aligns with New Zealand's focus on the tangible aspects of independence, rather than symbolic gestures. The act legally confirmed accepted practices without fundamentally altering New Zealand's sovereignty. The document contrasts this approach with that of Canada, which introduced a more explicitly distinct citizenship, highlighting the varying levels of emphasis on national identity versus the broader Commonwealth connection.

The document reveals concerns within New Zealand regarding the increasingly decentralized nature of Commonwealth consultation. The text notes a growing focus on regional interests rather than joint issues, with Canada cited as an example of a nation showing little interest in matters outside North America. This contrasts with New Zealand's retention of an imperial perspective, even amidst its growing independence. This perspective is exemplified by New Zealand's unique view of Egypt as a matter of joint Commonwealth concern. The lack of full consultation on significant matters, such as Britain's decision to devalue the pound, and the differences in views on the appropriate method of consultation (constant communication versus Prime Ministers' meetings), highlight the tensions between the desire for collaborative decision-making and the realities of separate national interests within the loosely structured Commonwealth. This section underscores New Zealand's concern over the balance between its own independence and the collaborative aspects of the Commonwealth.

Post-World War II, New Zealand's economic relationship with Great Britain remained central, operating largely within the framework of the Sterling Area. This system, formalized during the war, involved member countries conserving reserves to support the war effort and enforcing exchange controls on hard currency. New Zealand's participation in this system highlights the economic interdependence between the Dominion and Britain. This reliance is further evidenced by Britain's requests for maximal quantities of New Zealand foodstuffs to alleviate its post-war economic hardships, leading to the establishment of the voluntary "Food for Britain" organization in 1946. The increasing reliance on New Zealand's food exports underscores the extent of this economic tie. This economic reliance, however, did not guarantee reciprocal consultation, as evidenced by Britain's failure to inform its Commonwealth partners of its decision to devalue the pound sterling until one day prior to the official announcement, causing resentment and highlighting a tension between economic interdependence and the principles of Commonwealth consultation.

The text details the post-war currency crisis and its impact on New Zealand. In a personal telegram to Prime Minister Peter Fraser, Clement Attlee highlighted the urgency of the situation, requesting New Zealand's support in maintaining sterling balances. Specific measures were requested including restricting imports, conserving dollars (especially in areas like petrol and capital works), and accepting delays in the supply of essential goods. These requests show the extent to which Britain relied on New Zealand's cooperation to manage its economic difficulties. New Zealand's willingness to comply, despite the lack of prior consultation on the devaluation of the pound, showcases the continuing strength of economic ties and the willingness to support Britain's post-war recovery, even if this meant some constraint on New Zealand's own economic activity. The actions of Sir Patrick Duff, the High Commissioner in Wellington, in publicizing Britain's austerities, demonstrates the effort made to secure public support for this economic cooperation.

The economic relationship between New Zealand and Britain within the Sterling Area is characterized by a significant trade dependency. Britain's reliance on New Zealand for food supplies is emphasized, demonstrating the extent to which New Zealand's economy was interwoven with Britain's post-war recovery. While Britain advocated for maximum consultation on economic matters, the lack of concurrent information sharing regarding crucial decisions, such as the devaluation of the pound, highlights the limitations of such claims. This lack of transparency generated resentment, particularly among India's finance minister. This situation is illustrative of broader tensions within the Commonwealth, where economic realities sometimes overshadowed the principles of collaborative decision-making. The text emphasizes that trade dependency was willingly reinforced, even when accompanied by less than ideal consultation practices.

The accession of independent India and Pakistan to the Commonwealth presented a significant challenge to the existing structure. New Zealand, initially skeptical of India's avowed policies of republicanism and non-alignment, viewed these as potentially incompatible with Commonwealth principles. Prime Minister Peter Fraser's preference for a royalist Commonwealth is contrasted with the Indian government's view of Dominion status as a transitional formula toward a sovereign democratic republic. Despite the deliberate avoidance of the question of India's constitutional status at initial meetings, this remained a central, albeit often informally discussed, topic. Nehru, in consultation with Sir Stafford Cripps, outlined India's proposals for continued Commonwealth membership, emphasizing that it was a primarily political issue needing a practical resolution. The Jaipur Resolution (December 1948), securing Congress' approval for an Indian republic's continued membership, highlighted India's intention to remain part of the Commonwealth while maintaining its sovereignty.

The inclusion of India as a republic necessitated significant adjustments to the Commonwealth's established framework. The London Declaration, while ultimately allowing for India's continued membership, notably omitted any reference to a common status of Commonwealth citizenship, reflecting New Zealand's and others' veto of mutual citizenship rights with a non-European India. A confidential minute attached to the declaration reaffirmed that member nations did not consider themselves foreign to each other, maintaining existing preferential treatment for citizens and trade. This compromise aimed at maintaining the appearance of a cohesive Commonwealth linked by the Crown, while acknowledging the evolving reality of independent member states. The negotiations surrounding India's inclusion highlight the Commonwealth's ability to adapt and evolve in response to changing political landscapes while simultaneously addressing the sensitivities surrounding the continued role of the Crown.

The contrasting cases of India and Ireland highlight the diversity of approaches to Commonwealth membership. While India actively sought to maintain membership as a republic, Ireland's links had long been tenuous. The Irish government's decision to formally declare a republic and leave the Commonwealth resolved a long-standing anomaly, showcasing a different path to national independence. However, even in its departure, Ireland retained a special non-foreign status, demonstrating that the Commonwealth could accommodate varying degrees of association. New Zealand's recognition of this special status illustrates its willingness to adapt to changing circumstances while adhering to Commonwealth consensus. The comparison between India's successful negotiation of continued membership as a republic and Ireland's exit reveals the evolving nature of Commonwealth ties and the different ways in which member states could define their relationship with the broader organization.

The addition of non-European states, particularly India, raised concerns about the Commonwealth's future viability and internal cohesion. New Zealand's skepticism regarding India's republicanism and non-alignment reflected a perspective rooted in loyalty to the monarchy and concerns about maintaining the Commonwealth's established character. Despite the Commonwealth's flexible structure, based on consultation and cooperation, the addition of diverse nations raised questions about the long-term sustainability of its internal solidarity. Frank Corner's observation that much of the discussion about the Commonwealth was based on wish projection, rather than present actuality, highlighted the gap between idealistic views of the Commonwealth and the pragmatic realities of independent nation-states pursuing their individual interests. New Zealand's responses to these changes show a blend of its desire to preserve traditional Commonwealth ties and the recognition of the emergence of a new, more diverse and less rigidly defined structure.

Following World War II, Australia and New Zealand, recognizing the need for regional security arrangements in the Pacific, formalized their intentions in the Canberra Pact. This agreement, while not explicitly a formal military alliance, reflected a commitment to increased collaboration in defense matters and underscored the importance of a regional approach to security, independent of, but complementary to, the broader aims of the nascent United Nations. The inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as guaranteed by the United Nations further justified this regional focus. The document highlights the close security ties between Australia and New Zealand, particularly in light of the continuing presence of United States forces in the region, and the need to coordinate with this preeminent power, though not necessarily through formal pacts.

New Zealand's participation in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in Japan is detailed, illustrating both collaboration and friction within the Commonwealth. The document highlights a disagreement between Australia and New Zealand regarding the administration of the BCOF. Australia argued for sole control, with other contributing countries represented only by liaison staff, contrasting with New Zealand's preference for a joint Chiefs of Staff structure. This reveals underlying tensions in the organization and administration of joint Commonwealth military ventures. Canberra's strong assertion of its desire to manage the BCOF independently emphasizes its ambition for regional leadership within the Commonwealth. New Zealand's contrasting position showcases the complexities of inter-Commonwealth relations even in a shared undertaking.

The text explores the role of the United States in shaping New Zealand's post-war security strategy. Although the United States was unwilling to formalize a Pacific defense agreement with Commonwealth members, its implicit guarantee of New Zealand's security through its dominant naval presence and control of former Japanese territories provided a significant element in New Zealand's security calculations. The absence of a clear Pacific threat after Japan's defeat didn't lessen the importance of these relationships, although the lack of any formal pact underscores the evolving nature of security arrangements in the post-war era. The model of the Canada-US defense agreement was considered, but the United States' reluctance to commit to a formal regional agreement highlighted the limitations of the Commonwealth's influence in shaping Pacific security. The document ultimately points to a de facto arrangement where American power implicitly guaranteed New Zealand's security in the Pacific region.