Rape Shield Rule: Evidence

The section begins by outlining the historical practice of defense attorneys in rape and sexual assault cases using evidence of the alleged victim's sexual partners to suggest a propensity for consent or to discredit their testimony. This tactic aimed to portray the victim as a liar or someone who readily consents to sexual activity, regardless of the circumstances of the alleged assault. This practice led to significantly low conviction rates and underreporting of rape cases. The text mentions the influence of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 70s in giving rise to the anti-rape movement and subsequent passage of state rape shield laws. The Supreme Court's creation of Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the federal "rape shield" rule, is presented as a response to these concerns, protecting complainants from the exposure of their past sexual behavior unless compelling reasons for admissibility exist. The historical context underscores the need for protective measures to ensure fair trials and discourage tactics that victimize survivors further.

Rule 412(a)(1) explicitly states that evidence of an alleged victim's other sexual behavior is inadmissible to prove propensity to consent to sexual acts or conformity with such a propensity at the time of the alleged offense. This applies equally to both civil and criminal proceedings involving alleged sexual misconduct. The Advisory Committee's Note expands the definition of "other sexual behavior" to include not only physical sexual conduct, but also activities that imply sexual intercourse or contact. The case of Ledesma v. Gov’t of the Virgin Is. (159 F.Supp.2d 863 (D.V.I. 2001)) is cited as an example. The section emphasizes that this rule aims to prevent the use of such evidence to establish consent or undermine the victim's credibility. The rule's broad application extends beyond cases of rape or sexual assault to other scenarios, such as those related to sexual harassment.

This subsection focuses on Rule 412(a)(2), which prohibits the admission of evidence of an alleged victim's sexual predisposition. This includes evidence related to their mode of dress, speech, or lifestyle. The aim is to prevent the use of such evidence to prove propensity to consent or conformity to such a propensity at the time of the alleged offense. Examples provided include cases where evidence of prior consensual homosexual acts in a case of alleged homosexual rape (People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191 (Colo. 1996)), or evidence of prior consensual extramarital affairs in an alleged rape case (Truong v. Smith, 183 F.R.D. 273 (D. Colo. 1998)) were deemed inadmissible. The core principle remains the prevention of using such evidence to suggest consent or to unfairly prejudice the jury against the victim.

The section concludes with hypothetical scenarios that illustrate the practical application of Rule 412(a). Hypothetical 1 involves a defendant charged with criminal sexual abuse attempting to introduce evidence about the victims' profession as exotic dancers. Hypothetical 3 concerns a defendant attempting to introduce evidence of the alleged victim's relationship with another woman to suggest uncertainty in sexual preference and a potential motive for false accusations. These hypotheticals demonstrate the complexities involved in applying the rule, even in apparently straightforward cases. They illustrate the challenges in balancing the protection afforded by the Rape Shield Rule with the defendant's right to present a defense. The use of hypotheticals provides a practical context to the legal principles discussed.

This subsection details the exception in Rule 412(b)(1)(A), allowing evidence of a victim's other sexual behavior to prove that someone else caused their physical injuries. The admissibility hinges on demonstrating a direct link between the other sexual behavior and the physical injury. The example of United States v. Begay (937 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 2001)) shows that a court can err by excluding this kind of evidence if it's more probative than prejudicial. The key here is that the evidence is not being used to prove a propensity to consent, but rather to establish an alternative explanation for the physical injuries, thereby directly impacting the defendant's guilt or innocence. The probative value of this evidence must substantially outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice to the victim. It is important to note that some state counterparts, like Minnesota's Rule of Evidence 412(1)(B), are more restrictive and do not allow such evidence.

Rule 412(b)(1)(B) allows the admission of evidence showing prior consensual sexual acts between the alleged victim and the defendant. This exception is justified to demonstrate the existence of specific reasons to believe that consent might have been given at the time of the alleged offense. The case of State v. Sanchez-Lahora (616 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. App. 2000)) illustrates a situation where a trial court improperly excluded evidence of past consensual sexual relations between the victim and defendant. The evidence would be offered to rebut the victim's claim that they never engaged in sexual intercourse. It's crucial to remember that even if evidence meets this criteria, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (probative value outweighing unfair prejudice) still applies. The court maintains the power to exclude evidence, even if it technically falls under this exception, if it determines the potential for unfair prejudice is too high.

Rule 412(b)(1)(C) acts as a catch-all exception. It permits the admission of evidence regarding the victim's sexual history or predisposition if its exclusion would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, such as due process or the Confrontation Clause. This broad exception allows for admissibility when other exceptions may not apply but the exclusion of the evidence would significantly impede the defense. The Advisory Committee's Note highlights that this exception is similar in effect to the criminal exception in Rule 412(b)(1) but emphasizes the balancing test used in civil cases. The exception is frequently used for impeachment purposes, as demonstrated by cases like In re K.W. (666 S.E.2d 490 (N.C. App. 2008)), where suggestive photos and captions on a MySpace page were deemed relevant to impeach the victim's claim of virginity.

In civil cases, Rule 412(b)(2) establishes a different standard. Evidence of the alleged victim's sexual behavior or predisposition is admissible only if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and the danger of unfair prejudice to any party. The Advisory Committee's Note details the shift in burden of proof, placing it on the proponent to demonstrate admissibility. The rule also considers “harm to the victim,” including privacy invasion and potential for stereotypical thinking by the jury, as factors to be weighed. The standard for admissibility in civil cases is significantly higher than in criminal cases, reflecting a greater emphasis on protecting the victim. The case of B.K.B. v. 2001 is referenced to illustrate this principle, showing how the probative value must substantially exceed prejudice to be admissible. This section also addresses the admissibility of reputation evidence, highlighting that it's only admissible if the victim has already introduced their reputation into the case.

The document also briefly mentions other less frequently invoked exceptions. A common law exception allows defendants to introduce evidence of prior false rape, sexual assault, or child molestation allegations made by the same victim. North Carolina's Rule of Evidence 412(b)(4) provides a unique exception for evidence of sexual behavior offered to support expert testimony that the complainant fantasized or invented the alleged acts. The discussion of these exceptions, combined with numerous case examples (e.g., United States v. Ramone, Wells v. State), demonstrates the wide range of situations where courts have grappled with Rule 412 and its exceptions, often arriving at different conclusions depending on the specific facts and jurisdiction.

Rule 412(c) outlines the procedural requirements for offering evidence under the exceptions provided in Rule 412(b) in criminal cases. Its primary purpose is to ensure that the opposing party receives adequate notice, mirroring the discovery process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. This involves filing a written motion at least 14 days before trial, detailing the specific evidence and its intended purpose. The court then holds a hearing to determine admissibility. The rule aims to balance the defendant's right to present a defense with the protection of the alleged victim, ensuring fairness and due process for all parties involved. The notice requirement allows for a fair evaluation of the evidence and avoids surprises during trial. The court's decision on admissibility remains central, requiring a careful weighing of the evidence's probative value against potential prejudice and harm to the victim. The comparison to Rule 26 highlights the parallel effort to provide a structured and fair approach to handling sensitive evidence.

A party intending to offer evidence under Rule 412(b) exceptions in a criminal case must file a written motion at least 14 days before trial. This motion must specifically describe the evidence and state the purpose for which it's offered. The 14-day timeframe allows sufficient time for the opposing party to prepare their response and for the court to review the material before trial. The text notes that the court may adjust this timeframe based on good cause, granting flexibility when necessary. The detailed description requirement ensures that all relevant information is brought before the court, promoting a thorough assessment. The need for clear and timely notice protects the rights of both the defendant and the victim, preventing potential disruptions and ensuring fairness during the legal proceedings. This procedural aspect is essential in managing the complex evidentiary issues arising in sexual assault cases.

This subsection addresses the issue of whether a victim can immediately appeal a trial court's decision to admit evidence under Rule 412(c) before the conclusion of the criminal trial. This involves navigating the final judgment rule (28 U.S.C. § 1291), which generally limits appellate jurisdiction to final decisions. However, the document cites Doe v. United States (666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981)) as an example where the Fourth Circuit allowed an immediate appeal due to the significant injustice to the victim of delaying the appeal until after the trial concluded. The court applied a practical interpretation of the final judgment rule, recognizing the substantial harm to rape victims of delayed appeals. The discussion emphasizes that the courts balance the final judgment rule with the need to provide swift resolution of issues that impact a victim's rights and well-being. The case highlights the potential for exceptions to the general rule in situations involving exceptional circumstances, particularly concerning significant issues of injustice to victims.

The document highlights the importance of the defendant's rights during the Rule 412(c) hearing. A trial court violates the Rape Shield Rule or the defendant's right to counsel if it holds a hearing without allowing the defendant to attend or have legal representation. The case LaPointe v. State (225 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. App. 2001)) supports this. Even if the court allows arguments about admissibility under exceptions to the Rape Shield Rule, failure to hold a Rule 412(c) hearing will not automatically lead to reversal. Nevelow v. State is cited to illustrate the fact that appellate review of evidentiary appeals is still possible if the record is sufficient. The emphasis on the defendant's presence and representation during the hearing, as well as the availability of appellate review under certain circumstances, underscores the balance that the court must strike between protecting victims' rights and upholding defendants' due process rights.

This section uses numerous case examples to illustrate the application and interpretation of Rule 412. The cases demonstrate the challenges in applying the rule and its exceptions. State v. Sibley (33 S.W. 167 (Mo. 1895)) highlights the historical bias against women in legal proceedings. Ledesma v. Gov’t of the Virgin Is., People v. Murphy, and Truong v. Smith are used to exemplify scenarios where evidence of the victim's sexual behavior or predisposition was deemed inadmissible under Rule 412(a). Hypothetical examples also show the practical challenges of applying the rules in various situations. The cases cited demonstrate the variety of situations where the Rape Shield Rule comes into play, and how courts have applied the rule and its exceptions in real-world scenarios. The specific facts of each case, including the type of evidence offered and the court's reasoning, illustrate the nuanced and often contested nature of applying Rule 412.

Several cases are used to exemplify the different exceptions to the Rape Shield Rule under Rule 412(b). United States v. Pumpkin Seed, State v. Sanchez-Lahora, and State v. McBroom illustrate scenarios related to alternative sources of physical evidence and consensual sexual acts between the victim and the defendant. The discussion highlights discrepancies between the Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b)(1) and state counterparts, especially concerning the admissibility of evidence about the victim's other sexual behavior to prove that someone else caused their injuries. In re K.W. exemplifies the use of the constitutional rights exception (Rule 412(b)(1)(C)) and how prior false allegations can be admitted under certain circumstances. The role of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (probative value vs. prejudice) in evaluating the admissibility of evidence under these exceptions is emphasized. The analysis of these cases clarifies the conditions under which specific exceptions can be applied, and the considerations courts make when determining whether the probative value of such evidence outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice.

The section also utilizes several hypothetical scenarios to illustrate the application of Rule 412, offering practical context to the legal principles discussed. These include cases involving exotic dancers, a defendant arguing that the victim was using intercourse to determine her sexual preference, and a situation involving sexually explicit content on a MySpace page. In addition, the hypothetical situation involving Kobe Bryant demonstrates the complexities of DNA evidence in rape cases. Each hypothetical allows the reader to analyze the application of Rule 412 in unique fact patterns. The analysis of hypothetical cases clarifies the application of legal principles in diverse situations, helping readers to understand how the law functions in practice. Each case serves to further highlight the complexity and potential challenges in determining the admissibility of evidence under Rule 412, even with established exceptions.

The text continues to provide further examples of case law, exploring the broader applications and interpretations of the Rape Shield Rule. United States v. Ramone, Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America, and E.E.O.C. v. Donohue demonstrate different scenarios and approaches to applying the rule, with a focus on the balancing of probative value and potential prejudice. The discussion touches upon common law exceptions to rape shield rules, such as those involving prior false allegations. The section also highlights the differences in state rules, pointing out cases that involve variations in interpretation and application of the law across jurisdictions. Mention of United States v. Raplinger shows how the courts handle issues where consent may not be legally possible. These case examples highlight the importance of understanding the specific facts of each case and the prevailing legal standards within a particular jurisdiction.