Marx, Aristotle, & Eudaimonia: A Beatitude

The introduction challenges the prevailing view that Spinoza and Marx are primarily Epicurean thinkers, suggesting this interpretation is one-sided. The author proposes that an equally significant, if not more important, influence on both philosophers is Aristotle, specifically his concept of eudaimonia. The article aims to demonstrate this Aristotelian influence by examining how both Spinoza's "beatitude" and Marx's "real happiness" resonate with and build upon Aristotle's ideas. This re-evaluation seeks to establish a direct line of influence, a "normative materialist current," connecting Aristotle, Averroes, Spinoza, and Marx. By highlighting this connection, the author believes that we can better understand the critiques of capitalism, refine the concept of ecological sustainability, and fulfill the emancipatory promise inherent within Marxist thought. This framework allows for a more nuanced understanding of these major thinkers and their shared philosophical concerns regarding human flourishing and societal transformation. The author explicitly states their intention to chart the "Aristotelian lineage of Marx's eudaimonism," underscoring the importance of this historical and philosophical connection.

This section delves into Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia, clarifying that it should be understood as "flourishing" rather than simply "happiness." The text highlights that while eudaimonia is linked to rational activity, it isn't a monolithic concept; the specific ways individuals flourish vary, acknowledging different paths towards this ultimate good. The author notes that there is a universal aspect to human flourishing, which distinguishes it from culturally relative conceptions, and from flourishing in non-human animals. The Nicomachean Ethics is cited as the primary source for understanding Aristotle's exploration of eudaimonia, emphasizing the book's focus on understanding eudaimonia as the embodiment and realization of a life going as well as possible, rather than merely subjective pleasure. The text also introduces a crucial tension within Aristotle's thought: the ideal of a fully realized eudaimonia, versus a "second-best" form achievable in a world of scarcity, which necessitates reliance on practical wisdom and virtuous character. This tension, the author emphasizes, will prove relevant to understanding both Spinoza and Marx.

This subsection examines Marx's critique of Aristotle's economic theories, particularly his analysis of exchange-value. While acknowledging Aristotle's insightful analysis of exchange-value, Marx points out Aristotle's failure to identify the underlying "homogeneous element" of human labor as the common substance of value. The historical context is crucial here; the existence of slavery in ancient Greece is posited as an obstacle preventing Aristotle from adequately understanding value. This section delves into Marx's analysis, highlighting the historical-material conditions that shaped Aristotle's theoretical limitations. Marx's assertion that the concept of human equality was a precondition for understanding the true nature of value is a central theme here. The discussion emphasizes the contrast between Aristotle's vision of self-moving tools as a utopian ideal and the reality of labor under the ancient Greek economic system, underscoring the constraints imposed by the widespread reliance on slave labor. The author utilizes a passage from Marx’s Capital in which Marx suggests that the secret to understanding the expression of value—namely, the equality and equivalence of labor—could not be deciphered until human equality was a widely held belief. The text then connects this to William Morris’s reaction to Capital, revealing Morris's struggle with the more abstract economic arguments of Marx's work, despite enjoying the historical sections. This showcases the challenge of integrating Aristotle’s thought with a materialist critique of capitalism.

This section challenges the common interpretation of Spinoza's beatitude as solely an apolitical pursuit of the "intellectual love of God." The author argues that Spinoza's concept of beatitude is far more complex and has significant political implications. The text cites Spinoza's Ethics to support this claim, highlighting passages where Spinoza discusses beatitude in relation to the human mind and its connection to understanding God, his attributes, and actions. The section contrasts this understanding with the prevailing myth that Spinoza separated beatitude from political engagement. The passage describing beatitude as "serenity of mind (animi acquiescentia) that stems from intuitive knowledge of God," coupled with the assertion that perfecting the intellect is the same as understanding God, illustrates the nuanced connection Spinoza makes between intellectual and spiritual understanding, and its significance for human flourishing. The author sets the stage for a reinterpretation of Spinoza's concept of beatitude, moving away from its typical understanding as a solely religious and apolitical pursuit toward a more encompassing view of its relevance to human agency and collective action within the political realm.

Building on the previous section, this part explicitly links Spinoza's beatitude to political engagement and collective action. The author argues that if a multitude is guided by affects of humility, repentance, and reverence, it can achieve a form of communal well-being, challenging the separation of beatitude from the political sphere. This interpretation directly counters the idea that Spinoza relegated beatitude to an individual and purely intellectual pursuit. Spinoza's concept of beatitude, then, is repositioned as an experience that can inform and inspire collective political action. This section touches upon Spinoza's broader understanding of the intellect, suggesting that it's not merely a property of a select few but a resource available to all, capable of fueling collective empowerment. The concept of "nonlocality," while seemingly anachronistic, is used to represent the interconnectedness of the intellect and body within Spinoza's philosophy, reinforcing the notion that individual flourishing is inherently linked to collective well-being. The ultimate aim is to show that Spinoza's philosophy, properly understood, offers a compelling framework for understanding and engaging in political struggle.

This subsection focuses on the application of Spinoza's metaphysical framework to political thought, particularly in relation to overcoming capitalism. The author proposes a re-ordering of Spinoza's Ethics, beginning with finite modes (human beings) and moving outward to understand the unity of diversity in substance. This approach helps reinterpret Spinoza's concept of substance as a point of arrival rather than departure. The author argues that understanding the interconnectedness of all things, within Spinoza's metaphysical system, is crucial for effective political action, allowing for the development of anti-capitalist strategies that comprehend capitalism's embeddedness within a larger system (nature or God). The idea of an "eternal dimension" to political struggle is introduced, arguing that overcoming capitalism requires a perspective that transcends immediate concerns, encompassing the long-term vision of human flourishing. The author uses terms like "beatitude" and "perspective of eternity" to capture this vision of transforming society into one that prioritizes the common interest of all humanity, envisioning a future liberated from the constraints of capitalist private property and the exploitation inherent within it. This is presented as a more comprehensive perspective for political action based upon a deep understanding of Spinoza's ontology.

This section introduces Averroes and his significant role in interpreting and transmitting Aristotelian thought. The author emphasizes Averroes's influence on the reception of Aristotle in 13th-century Europe, focusing on three key areas of contention: the eternity of the world, the unity of the intellect, and the relationship between faith and reason. Averroes's early distinction between the receptive intellect (innate capacity for thought) and the agent intellect (transcendent activity) is described. However, the section highlights a later, more nuanced distinction Averroes made between the material intellect (a single, eternal, incorporeal substance) and each individual's imaginative intellect. The author uses the Latinized name "Averroes" to emphasize the universalizable nature of his thought and its profound impact on subsequent philosophical developments. This sets the stage for understanding Averroes's contribution to the intellectual lineage being traced, highlighting his role in shaping how Aristotle's ideas were received and reinterpreted in the following centuries. The significance of this distinction in the context of Spinoza's philosophy is previewed, creating anticipation for the connections to be drawn in later sections.

This section focuses on Averroes's doctrine of the unity of intellect, a concept that has been highly contentious. The author explains Averroes's view that there is no personal immortality for individual humans, suggesting that after death, souls merge into a single, unified intellect. This idea is contrasted with the views of Pierre Bayle, who found Averroes's doctrine "appalling" and saw its "monstrous" expression in Spinoza's philosophy. The text discusses Bayle's critique of Averroes and Spinoza, characterizing Spinoza as a "systematic atheist" whose philosophical system is utterly opposed to common sense. Bayle's particular objection is to the idea that the intellect is unique and not tied to individual human bodies, as this entails the unity of intellect for all human beings. The author analyzes Leibniz's perspective, who saw Averroes and Spinoza as philosophical allies in a view he strongly opposed, viewing them both as advocating that each individual's specific receptive intellect is merely a mode of the agent intellect. This sets the stage for contrasting the implications of this doctrine for different philosophical traditions.

This section examines the influence of Averroes's philosophy, particularly his concept of the unity of intellect, on Spinoza's thought. The author argues that by understanding the Averroist tradition, we can better grasp Spinoza's conception of the intellect as presented in Part 2 of the Ethics. This understanding is crucial for comprehending the implications of Spinoza's philosophy for politics and collective action. The section highlights the connection between Spinoza's argument (in E2p45) that knowledge of a singular thing necessitates an understanding of God's eternal and infinite essence, and the Averroist emphasis on the unity of the intellect. The author contends that this concept of the intellect, which is not understood as solely located in the individual but rather as existing at multiple ontological levels simultaneously, challenges the traditional division of humanity based on varying degrees of reason. The re-interpretation of intellect as a collective resource available to all, rather than a property of the select few, is posited as crucial to achieving collective human flourishing. This re-evaluation of Spinoza's philosophy, informed by a knowledge of Averroes's intellectual legacy, thus offers a different perspective on his metaphysics and its potential contributions to social and political thought.

This section establishes a crucial link between Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia (flourishing) and the contemporary challenge of ecological sustainability. The author argues that a truly sustainable future requires not only the possibility of human flourishing but also the flourishing of other life forms on the planet. This is presented as a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of sustainability than simply focusing on the continuation of human existence. The author uses John Ehrenfeld's definition of ecological sustainability—'the possibility that human and other life will flourish on this planet forever'—as a starting point for this discussion. Although acknowledging that eternal flourishing may not be entirely attainable, the text emphasizes the importance of considering sustainability from an "eternal perspective," reflecting the longer-term implications for both human and non-human life. This 'eternal perspective' is connected to the broader philosophical framework developed throughout the article, suggesting that achieving genuine ecological sustainability necessitates a fundamental shift away from the dominant capitalist paradigm, which is seen as inherently unsustainable.

This subsection addresses the ideological manipulation of the concept of "sustainability." The author argues that a superficial understanding of sustainability, one that doesn't grapple with the underlying systemic issues, can lead to its appropriation for purposes that are contrary to true sustainability. Therefore, a deeper, more comprehensive philosophical approach is proposed, one that integrates the concept of flourishing across human and non-human life. This approach calls into question the current dominant ideology's definition of sustainability, which often ignores the interconnectedness of social and environmental issues. The author implies that a truly sustainable future requires a move away from narrowly defined economic goals, suggesting the need for a more holistic and ethically informed approach to sustainability that embraces the interconnectedness of life itself. The concept of the Anthropocene and its potential for collapsing into the "Eremocene" or "Age of Loneliness" is invoked to illustrate the urgency of the ecological crisis, underscoring that a fundamental change is required to secure a future where collective flourishing can be realised.

This section concludes by connecting the Aristotelian concept of flourishing, the Spinozistic concept of beatitude, and Marx's notion of "real happiness" to the pursuit of ecosocialism. The text argues that these philosophical perspectives provide a strong foundation for advocating for ecosocialist policies and actions aimed at achieving a truly sustainable future. The necessity of building a fossil-fuel-free world as a precondition for collective flourishing is emphasized. The author suggests that a deeper understanding of the interconnectedness of social and ecological issues, informed by these philosophical traditions, is vital for challenging the ideological manipulation of the term "sustainability." The implication is that building a sustainable future requires not only technological innovation ("ingenuity") but also conscious societal change ("self-control"), guided by a commitment to a broader understanding of what constitutes true human flourishing (and that of other life). The author links this pursuit to Marx's concept of "real happiness," implying that a just and ecologically sustainable society is a necessary condition for achieving genuine human fulfillment and collective well-being.